The struggles and structures inside the Columbus Police Department were released in a detailed draft report of results in a Jensen Hughes’s independent assessment of the Department.

Freddie Blackmon, who went from patrol officer in 1986 to police chief in 2020, has reorganized the department with 21st century policing. CNAW2NEWS.com, since day one of his reign over the department, has covered the department with both positive and negative news.

In this detailed report, we will showcase the information released in a 157 page report by Jensen Hughes. The report, from Jensen Hughes, provides findings and recommendations designed to improve the Columbus Police Department, address leadership issues and challenges regarding CPD member retention and provide strategic direction to address gangs and crime in the city.

“Based on our assessment, we believe the Columbus Police Department needs additional personnel to meet the City of Columbus’s public safety needs and the expectations of city residents. However, in addition to hiring new personnel, we have identified opportunities for the police department to operate more efficiently through a more strategic approach to its operations and by potentially hiring civilians to perform functions that do not require sworn personnel. Finally, we have provided recommendations which can help to retain CPD officers. These recommendations also create an opportunity to create a new public-private partnership focused on improving the Columbus Police Department and ensuring public safety. Our assessment revealed there is great interest on the part of many community stakeholders to participate actively in such efforts.

Jensen Hughes stated in the report, they were asked to go assess the department’s current operations and provide the department and stakeholders with a written assessment report containing observations, findings and recommendations for policy, procedure and organizational changes to the police department to ensure it is using best practices and sound policies in all phases of its work.

The principal focus of their assessment efforts included the following key tasks: Conducting a comprehensive review of the CPD’s management and organizational structure, assessing the organization’s policies, procedures and protocols for recruiting, hiring and retaining qualified police personnel, with emphasis on identifying issues that may be impeding the organization’s ability to address this important area successfully, conducting a scientific study of the current staffing at CPD and assessing CPD’s current deployment strategies to determine whether there are more effective ways of assigning current and/ or future positions should they be made available, and assessing the current strategies for providing Community Oriented Policing services to the Columbus community, with a focus on determining the degree to which CPD is leveraging community resources effectively as it strives to meet the expectations of the community, as well as assessing the current policies, procedures and protocols for CPD’s patrol-based and investigative efforts to address gang participation and crime in Columbus.

Jensen Hughes to get the best possible response from their assessment, they performed the following tasks: Collected and analyzed computer-aided dispatch (CAD) data and other data documenting calls for service, department-initiated activities and other activities, reviewed and assessed the CPD’s organization, command structure, mission, values and cultural environment, Reviewed departmental policies, orders, directives, staffing and deployment, and training information, conducted on-site reviews during two site visits to examine police operations and officers’ and supervisors’ activities, including participating in ride-alongs with patrol staff, and attending and observing in-service training sessions and community meetings, conducted over 90 interviews with department stakeholders, including: Police chief and command staff, CPD supervisors, patrol staff, investigators and civilian staff, city officials, Muscogee County Sheriff, community members, and business community members.

Here are the Key Findings from the assessment:

1. Members of the department are dedicated to improving the CPD and its service to the community

Despite issues related to low staffing, non-competitive salaries and concerns about the management of the Columbus Police Department, many interviewees throughout the CPD expressed their respect for the Columbus community and showed impressive and admirable leadership, loyalty and dedication to the ideals of policing, the department and the community.

2. The CPD has demonstrated its commitment to following best practices and national standards by maintaining its Commission on Accreditation of Law Enforcement Agencies (CALEA) accreditation since 1993, as well as accreditation by the Georgia Association of Chiefs of Police.

The accreditation process focuses on ensuring law enforcement agencies and their policies follow best practices related to life, health and safety. To become accredited, agencies must conduct a self-assessment and participate in web-based file reviews and an on-site assessment to confirm they comply with the standards. In addition to obtaining CALEA accreditation, law enforcement agencies must continue to demonstrate ongoing compliance by tracking their performance and completing appropriate reports, analyses, reviews and other mandated activities for the accreditation period.

3. The CPD is currently understaffed, impacting its ability to engage in proactive policing and community policing and its ability to investigate crime and effectively address gang activity in Columbus.

Our staffing study estimates the CPD needs between 157-196 officers and corporals assigned to patrol to respond to calls for service and still have 50 percent to 60 percent of their time dedicated to proactive policing. One of the reasons for this high number is that the current 10-hour patrol work schedule is inefficient. Currently, the CPD has assigned 118 patrol officers and corporals to patrol. If the CPD were to change patrol to a 12-hour schedule, the patrol officer estimate is reduced to the range of 127 to 158, depending on the amount of time the administration wants dedicated to proactive policing. The current 118 personnel assigned to patrol falls below that range, but it is also important to note that the CPD reduced the number of persons assigned to several specialty units to fill gaps in patrol, severely limiting the effectiveness of these specialty units. We estimate that the Bureau of Investigations will need another 20-22 officers assigned to the Bureau to invmestigate crimes and engage in proactive policing effectively. In part, the understaffing can be mitigated by converting some functions currently filled by sworn personnel to civilians.

4. Low morale exists at CPD due in part because of current leadership and management issues.

Although a number of social factors, including recent high-profile police incidents, make serving as a Chief of Police almost anywhere in the nation today one of the most stressful, demanding and, often, thankless jobs, it is both an honor and a challenge to lead a police department in efforts to protect a community. As such, it is imperative leaders of police departments possess strong leadership skills and the ability to interact and communicate with individuals within a department and in the community to be successful. Based upon numerous interviews our team members conducted, we found there is significant consensus among people within and outside the department that substantial attention needs to be given to addressing current leadership and management issues at CPD. The very low morale that currently exists at CPD is due in large part to these issues, which in turn has impacted CPD operations and the agency’s ability to attract and retain officers. As well-intentioned as current leadership efforts are, and as honorable as those providing these services are, this is a critical area that needs to be addressed.

5. The Office of Professional Standards includes functions and duties that are more appropriately housed in other bureaus of the department.

The CPD’s Office of Professional Standards is assigned five functions with the department – internal investigations, planning and research, staff inspections, accreditation and criminal intelligence. The Gang Analysis and Investigation function also resides in OPS. Criminal Intelligence and gang intelligence functions normally reside in investigative or patrol bureaus of a police department to ensure these units are meeting operational needs. Additionally, housing these functions in the same office as internal investigations has reportedly had a chilling effect on department members’ willingness to share and trust information with these units in OPS.

6. The CPD continues to struggle with the retention of police officers, and the department does not have a formal retention strategy.

Retention at the CPD has been a significant concern for several years, not just during this current administration. Between 2016 and 2020, 241 officers resigned from the department, averaging 49 officers per year. In 2021, 84 officers resigned from the department. While efforts have been made to address some concerns of department members, including a pay study which resulted in salary increases for some officers, the department has not developed a formal strategy to address retention issues for the long term.

7. CPD’s recruitment and hiring policies and practices largely align with best practices.

Consistent with the Final Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing, CPD’s policies support its commitment to recruiting qualified minority applicants to ensure its workforce reflects the diversity of the City of Columbus. The department has been innovative and creative in its recruitment strategies, which have expedited the hiring process and increased the potential applicant pool of diverse candidates. The department’s completion of a yearly analysis of recruitment and hiring is a promising practice that measures the performance and outcomes of the department’s recruiting efforts and is informative in the development of the following year’s annual recruitment plan.

8. The Bureau of Investigations is understaffed but could improve its efficiency and effectiveness by adopting best practices and civilianizing some positions.

Due to the department’s current personnel shortages and the need to staff the Bureau of Patrol, some units within the Bureau of Investigation are at low staffing levels. The Bureau’s strength on January 1, 2020, was 90 sworn and seven non-sworn members. Overall, the department has 22 fewer sworn personnel and two fewer non-sworn personnel assigned to the Bureau of Investigations than it had in 2020. The Bureau does not always use technology effectively to manage it caseloads or effectively use solvability factors which would allow the Bureau to prioritize the work of its investigators. Finally, some of the positions in the Bureau, such as in the Computer Crime Unit and the Crime Scene Investigations Division, do not require sworn employees and could be replaced with trained civilians, thereby freeing up some sworn personnel for other critical assignments.

9. The Department is not guided by a written strategic plan that outlines each member of thedepartment’s responsibility for community policing.

While the two persons assigned to the Crime Prevention Unit are very busy and enthusiastic about their work, the function itself is not supported by a written strategic plan that includes written goals, objectives, and measurable outcomes for all units of the department. A written strategic plan can provide additional guidance not only to this unit, but also enhance the entire department’s ability to incorporate the concepts of

community-oriented policing in all its operations. The current focus of the department’s community relations efforts appears to be in a public relations role, rather than a community-oriented policing/problem-solving mindset based upon proactive collaboration with community stakeholders who are willing to work shoulder-to-shoulder with the department to address a number of important community issues and concerns.

10. The department lacks well-developed supervisory training, which can contribute to department effectiveness and officer retention.

The CPD has not developed its own formal mentorship or leadership development program, nor does it consistently adhere to a formal supervisory training program for new or existing supervisors. Career and leadership development programs are important to department members and can contribute to their effectiveness and increased retention. First-line supervisors are the backbone of any police department’s patrol operations and should be afforded the opportunity to participate in training to enhance their skills.

11. The department’s promotional processes for the positions of sergeant, lieutenant and captain are transparent, but the process of assigning personnel to various bureaus in the department lacks the same transparency.

General Order 4-6 establishes exceptional transparency and aptly lists the police ranks subject to the promotional process, eligibility (tenure and education) and the promotional process for each rank, and the subsequent method of selection. CPD promotional ranks include the position of sergeant, lieutenant and captain. Ranks of corporal, deputy chief and assistant chief are by appointment of the chief. The CPD does not have a policy specific to assignment, rotation and transfer procedures or processes. This lack of a transparent process causes concern from department members who have been transferred without prior notice or transferred to positions which are not consistent with their career goals or interests. Command staff and supervisors also expressed concern about the lack

of consultation and communication when a person is transferred into or out of their bureau or unit.

12. The department’s training program is consistent with best practices and a source of pride for department members.

During interviews, most department members identified training as one of the things the CPD does well. The CPD’s approach to training, from recruit training through annual in-service, is serving the department well and is delivered in an organized, efficient manner. The training unit effectively used virtual training tools to ensure staff was appropriately trained during the pandemic.

13. The department does not always use data and technology effectively to inform decisionmaking and policing strategies.

We found the use of standalone spreadsheets throughout the department to be an inefficient and ineffective use of technology. The department’s Crime Intelligence Unit is underutilized and is not producing predictive, actionable intelligence for the Bureau of Patrol or Investigations, nor is it meeting the needs of personnel in the field. The Criminal Intelligence Unit does have the capacity and interest to perform more analyses, participate in more training, and expand connections and the exchange of information with other law enforcement and criminal justice intelligence practitioners to augment their skills and processes. Being housed in the Office of Professional Standards hinders information sharing between the Criminal Intelligence Unit and the field.

14. The department’s CompStat process is neither effective nor efficient.

CompStat is a nationally recognized process that requires police departments to gather timely, accurate information about crime patterns, and then respond quickly to break up those patterns or to prevent crimes from occurring. It is focused on information sharing, responsibility, accountability and effectiveness to reduce crime and achieve goals. During the CompStat meeting we observed, which others told us was typical of a CPD CompStat meeting, the chief was minimally engaged, captains were not asked about how they planned to address problems in their areas of responsibility, there was no effort by commanders or presenters to offer enforcement strategies initiate investigative efforts based upon the crime data presented, and the commanders did not use this time to highlight the work efforts of their respective bureaus or units.

15. The City of Columbus does not have a written overall gang strategy that encompasses prevention, intervention and suppression of gangs.

Most of the CPD personnel we interviewed stated gang-related violence and crime has significantly increased and become prevalent within the past couple years, in part due to the rapid emergence of local hybrid gangs. During our interviews, gang experts said, based on reliable intelligence and Georgia Department of Corrections information, there are approximately 1,800 gang members in Columbus. At the time of our assessment, the CPD Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit had 446 validated gang member profiles in its records management system. Addressing issues related to gangs should include a comprehensive strategy that addresses prevention, intervention and suppression. While the city provides some funding for gang prevention and intervention, it has not developed a comprehensive approach in conjunction with the police department. In fact, the police department does not have a gang enforcement strategy or a gang enforcement unit, and it does not engage in formal full-time participation on any local, regional, state or federal task force focused on gangs, drugs illegal guns or violent offenders.

16. The City of Columbus’ leading businesses are proud of the city and have expressed their willingness to assist the City and police department.

This assessment was funded by a group of leading Columbus business. They were concerned about, among other things, rising crime rates and retention of Columbus Police Department members. They expressed interest in supporting initiatives which help to improve the Columbus

Police Department and reduce overall crime within the city. This provides an opportunity for the city and the police department to partner with these businesses to take advantage of private industry’s expertise in leadership, strategy development and effective use of technology.

VACANCIES AND CURRENT STAFF

Columbus Police Department is allocated to have 444 full time sworn in officers, but there are 137 vacancies, which leads to current staff being at 307. The department is also allocated to have 13 part time sworn in officers, but there is 1 vacancy, which leads to current staff being at 12. The department is allocated to have 113 full time civilian jobs, but there is 16 vacancies. which leads to current staff being at 97. There are also allocated to have 25 cadets, etc., but there is 22 vacancies, which leads to current staff being at 3.

CRIME INCREASES IN COLUMBUS

The following table shows the Part One crime data from the years 2019 through 2021. The chart reveals a significant increase in murders and aggravated assaults in 2021. The increase in motor vehicle theft was a central point of discussion throughout their assessment; they heard from one prominent business leader who had their vehicle stolen from a parking garage in mid-afternoon. Gangs and their impact on crime was another central point of discussion and was likely a significant contributor to the murder and aggravated assaults in Columbus. The community and most of the department staff members they spoke with confirmed the presence and impact the gangs in Columbus have on violent crime.

PART ONE CRIME DATA

At the date of this report, the CPD has reported Part One crime data from the first three quarters of 2022. To provide a comparison to previous years, in the following table, they tabulated the Part One crime data for the first three quarters of 2019 through 2022. As indicated below, all Part One crimes with the exception of robbery are lower for the first three quarters of 2022 as compared to the first three quarters of 2021. The murder totals for the first three quarters of 2022 are similar to those in 2019 and 2020, but much less than 2021. Reported aggravated assaults in the first three quarters in 2022 are higher than they were in the similar reporting periods in 2019 and 2020, but slightly lower than 2021. Overall, the 5,108 Part One crimes reported for the first three quarters of 2022 are down from the 6,461 reported in in the first three quarters of 2019.

Department Management and Organization

The following is word-for-word of what Jensen-Hughes report said:

The Columbus Police Department is overseen by Chief Freddie Blackmon who was confirmed unanimously as the city’s police chief on November 17, 2020. Chief Blackmon is a veteran of the department, beginning his career in 1986 as a patrol officer. Throughout his career he was assigned to various sections, including special operations, vice/narcotics, gang task force and the investigative bureau, where he also served as a lieutenant. Chief Blackmon’s command assignments included serving as personnel director and overseeing the Office of Professional Standards (OPS).

Soon after his appointment, Chief Blackmon successfully proposed a reorganization of the department to the City Council. Previously, the department had four bureaus, commanded by the rank of major, which fell under the authority of one assistant chief who reported to the chief. The reorganization added an assistant chief position and changed the rank of major to deputy chief, while adding a fifth deputy chief. Deputy chiefs oversee the bureaus of patrol, investigative services, support services and administrative support services, and the additional deputy chief position was created to oversee the Office of Professional Standards. While the existing four command level positions report to one of the two assistant chiefs, the deputy chief assigned to OPS reports directly to the chief. This reorganization also included a change to the eligibility requirements for the positions of assistant chief and deputy chief.

The change reduced the time in grade at previous command level positions to be eligible for appointment to a deputy chief or assistant chief position. Conversely, the reorganization also included increased requirements for promotion to the corporal and sergeant position.

The team reviewed the chief’s reorganization presentation to the City Council to examine the information provided to support the proposed changes. They learned a previous administration had two assistant chiefs, and the chief noted the proposed organizational structure would enable the department to operate more efficiently, as more centralization would be given to operations and administration responsibilities. Based on their review of the archived City Council meeting minutes, we could not determine if Chief Blackmon provided an additional level of detail for the proposed reorganization. Similarly, they found no specific reference to the addition of a fifth deputy chief to command the Office of Professional Standards in the presentation.

We did note the presentation included significant supportive information for changing the rank of major to deputy chief; in summary, the chief explained the change was implemented to align with Pillar One in the Report of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing. The chief noted some citizens do not understand the rank insignia difference between major, sergeant, or other ranks. He said with the title of deputy chief of police, citizens will be aware of the authority associated with that position, under the premise that people are more likely to obey the law when they believe those who are enforcing it have authority that is perceived as legitimate by those subject to the authority. However, this justification is not consistent with the spirit of Pillar One of the 21st Century Policing Report, as police legitimacy does not rest with uniforms, titles or insignias but rather that the public confers legitimacy only to those they believe are acting in procedurally just ways, and that the police are not viewed as an occupying force imposing control.

During their interviews the reorganization was voiced frequently as a point of contention. Many CPD personnel they spoke with, both sworn and civilian, raised concerns about the effectiveness of the current organizational structure and the specific assignments, and questioned the motive and process that led to the reorganization and assignments.

To be clear, section 17-21.3 of the city ordinance states “All personnel in all sections, units and bureaus shall be assigned by the chief of police.” We heard repeatedly through interviews they did not see the need for reorganization, and it had not been explained or effectively communicated. A greater level of transparency could have potentially alleviated such questions and speculation. Such transparency would be consistent with the concept of internal procedural justice, which is the effort law enforcement leadership takes

to ensure department personnel are treated fairly. Applying procedural justice concepts within a police department contributes to employee morale and satisfaction.

Additionally, promoting internal procedural justice supports procedural justice in the field during police-citizen interactions.

We heard frequent concerns regarding the specific assignments resulting from the reorganization, reported by many as not being aligned with the respective commanders’ skill or strengths. During interviews, they were repeatedly told it was interviewees’ opinion that while the chief created the organizational structure and appointed the command staff, he would not let them command. They were frequently told the chief has created an environment of micromanagement, and while the department has some talented commanders, they are not being effectively utilized. The sentiment they received through interviews was the command staff was not working together and thus not as effective as they could or should be.

They heard of the impact of the attrition challenges, represented through sections or units that have been significantly reduced in staff to the point of ineffectiveness. The former metro narcotics unit and Southeast Regional Task Force are no longer operational. Special Operations, the once thriving pro-active policing unit, now operates at a fraction of the former staffing. The Vice/Narcotics Unit has been reduced to two full-time officers with secondary support. The Special Operations Unit has been designated as the Fugitive Unit. They transport fugitives on outstanding warrants and spend only limited time engaged in working narcotics or special enforcement, as it cannot be achieved safely with current staffing levels. Similarly, the Motor Unit, the primary traffic and accident investigation unit, is operating at 25% of the former staffing. Our interviews revealed these sections perform a much-needed service to impact problem areas positively. The need for additional command staff, when operational staffing has diminished, raises questions.

As a newly appointed chief, changes in organizational structure occur and should be expected; however, the operational necessity or benefit to support the chief’s reorganization were not effectively communicated effectively throughout the department.

Their interviews also revealed a general feeling of distrust throughout the department’s rank-and-file. The lack of communication from the chief was voiced frequently in interviews. Those interviewed want to understand the direction the department is going and why the chief is doing what he is doing. We heard through interviews that while they have heard about 21st Century Policing and Community Policing from the chief, the chief has not effectively explained those terms and has not operationalized those concepts to provide guidance to department members.

Internal Communication and Leadership

The following is word-for-word of what Jensen-Hughes report said:

Serving as a Chief of Police is one of the toughest jobs that exists, particularly today given the ongoing criticism that many are directing at law enforcement agencies and their leaders across the country. Yet one who takes on the mantle of leading a law enforcement agency is rightfully expected to tackle day-to-day challenges with confident leadership and vigor, as that is what is expected by both a department’s rank-and-file members as well as by the myriad community stakeholders and residents the chief and department serve. We preface this section with this statement because our assessment surfaced a number of internal and external concerns that were shared with us about the way the department is being led. Hence, our task to assess the current state of operations at CPD would not be thorough, fair nor objective if we did not provide in this section of our report what our assessment revealed in this key focus area. As such, in the following paragraphs, it is not our intent to be hypercritical about CPD leadership, particularly given the challenges that come with leading a police department; rather, it is our intent to highlight what we learned during our work at CPD and surface issues of concern so that current CPD leadership is aware of the criticisms and can take direct action to address them so the department may move forward. Doing so will be critical if the agency is to address many of the recruiting, hiring and retention challenges CPD is currently experiencing.

Both internal communication and leadership were common themes that surfaced throughout our many interviews. During our assessment, we had opportunities to speak with personnel throughout the department of all ranks, races, genders, ages, tenures and assignments as well as observe some internal CPD functions, such as the Office of the Month Award ceremony. Through these interactions and our interviews, we learned and observed the chief struggles at times to act effectively as the ambassador for the department, or to communicate effectively the mission and vision of the department. Further, interviewees advised the chief has consistently demonstrated an unwillingness to include the input and ideas of his appointed command staff and has fostered a culture that represses creativity and vision. Even at the civilian and field level, interviewees expressed frustration that their voices were not heard. As referenced previously, Pillar One of the President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing is building trust and legitimacy. Recommendation 1.4 states law enforcement agencies should promote legitimacy internally within the organization by applying the principles of procedural justice. Internal procedural justice begins with the clear

articulation of organizational core values, and the transparent creation and fair application of an organization’s policies, protocols and decision-making processes. If the workforce is actively involved in policy development, workers are more likely to use these same principles that help facilitate internal collaboration to help ensure external procedural justice is implemented in their interactions with the community. Even though the approach to implementing procedural justice is “top down,” the method should include all employees to reach a shared vision and mission more effectively.

On more than one occasion we were told by field-level employees of recommendations presented for consideration that never received a response. One individual lamented the lack of response, stating the chief should at least tell them it was a bad idea and acknowledge the individual’s efforts to contribute. At the lowest level, personnel believe decisions are made by the chief and a select inner circle that does not include his entire appointed command staff. Even more critical was the idea that the decisions that are being made relate to addressing short-term satisfaction and do not address the root of the problems and issues facing the department. Decisions such as purchasing new patrol vehicles, uniforms and allowing facial hair, while well-received, are seen not only by some command level personnel but also rank and file as easy “wins” that will soon lose luster.

We learned the chief requested a group of officers from various ranks to comprise a retention committee. These officers were asked to seek input from their colleagues regarding the retention issue. Specifically, they were asked to identify why officers are leaving. Participation on this committee was limited. Given the opportunity to provide input, we were told many declined, stating it would not matter, nothing would come of it, and they felt their concerns would not get addressed. In March 2022, the results of the committee’s work were provided to the chief. Consistent with the sentiment of our many interviewees, while pay compression was a concern, it was secondary to poor morale – the perceived result of micromanagement in leadership. Interestingly, we frequently heard in interviews that pay compression was a secondary issue and some officers were leaving to join other departments for less money due to sentiments about the way the department is being led.

As indicated, we had opportunities to observe internal CPD functions and in each case our team expected to see the chief embrace the opportunity to communicate his direction and vision, and what role those in attendance played. However, in each case the chief was minimally engaged, if at all, in the function. For example, at the Officer of the Month Award, attended by the mayor, members of the community, and officers and families, the chief arrived after the ceremony had started and stood quietly off to the side of the room offering no comments. This was a missed opportunity to thank publicly the officers and to speak about the department and the vision. This lack of fundamental leadership was frequently voiced in interviews with department personnel and reiterated by community members and leaders who expect their chief to provide direction and vision.

It should be noted our team attended a Zoom meeting to provide a mid-assessment progress report. The meeting was hosted by the community business leaders, and the mayor and Chief Blackmon were seated in the room. While seated with the mayor and the community’s business leaders, a rare opportunity with a pivotal audience, specifically assembled to discuss his department, the chief did not acknowledge the participants’ interest in the department, thank them or offer any comments.

Officers interviewed voiced concerns about this lack of leadership, in failing to communicate and when doing so, a lack of transparency. Officers expressed concerns that in public settings the chief is not transparent with the public and they witness the public’s frustration. Officers told our team about instances where the public was asking what they could do to help, and the chief declined assistance. While officers we spoke with repeatedly stated they rarely hear from the chief, what they have heard is “community policing;” as such, the officers question why the chief does not accept input or assistance offered by the community and are quick to point out he does not accept input or assistance from within his own department either.

Salary and Pay Study

The following is word-for-word of what Jensen-Hughes report said:

As indicated above, one of the top reasons for leaving the department is concerns about salary. On August 23, 2022, Columbus Consolidated Government released a classification and compensation analysis conducted by Evergreen Solutions. The analysis was requested by the CCG to, among

other things, review CCG employee salaries and benefits to ensure they continue to attract and retain necessary staff to deliver services to the public. The analysis reviewed and compared salaries and benefits of CCG employees as compared to positions in similarly situated government entities. Public safety salaries, specifically police salaries, were part of that study. While the analysis includes a lot of details and comparisons, a few things stand out regarding public safety and police department salaries.

The compensation analysis consisted of an external market assessment and an internal equity assessment. CCG’s compensation was compared to average compensation offered in markets in which CCG competes for employees. The analysis found CCG is slightly lagging in the market, compared with its peers. The analysis noted pay compression, and a lack of variation in salaries between employees with significantly distinct levels of experience and responsibility, were concerns in Columbus and a potential threat to internal equity and morale. An example of pay compression is when the pay of supervisors and their subordinates is too close, or when the pay of highly tenured staff and newly hired employees in the same job is too similar. This was one of the common complaints we heard from CPD staff.

Overall, the analysis found Columbus Consolidated Government was comparable to the market with respect to the benefits portion of total compensation. This is important because while salary is important to employees, the total benefits package can be a factor in retaining employees.

The analysis resulted in recommendations regarding a new pay structure for CCG employees generally, and a new pay structure for public safety employees. The analysis also recommended the CCG conduct small-scale salary surveys as needed to assess the market competitiveness of hard- to-fill classifications and/or classifications with retention issues, and adjust pay grade assignments if necessary. This is particularly important for the CPD as police jobs have become very competitive, with various departments in the market offering signing bonuses and increased starting salaries.

Finally, the analysis recommended CCG enact the second phase of implementing the new pay plan, which would involve a one-time salary adjustment for employees to ensure they are placed in the proper percentile of their salary range.

While the pay study was being disclosed publicly during our site visit, we observed many CPD employees watching the presentation anxiously waiting for news their pay would increase to keep up with market rates for police employees. At a later site visit, we heard several employees express their disappointment over what they were informed would be their respective pay increases based on the staffing study, with some reporting they would receive minimal pay increases.

Oversight and Accountability

The following is word-for-word of what Jensen-Hughes report said:

We reviewed a use of force report involving a taser discharge and observed it was forwarded February 9, 2022, by the investigating supervisor. The report was not reviewed by the chief until May 6, 2022. We find leaving an officer awaiting determination of their application of force for three months is excessive and potentially unsettling.

Additionally, should an officer have used force in a manner inconsistent with policy or law, the lengthy review process does not provide for timely corrective action before a potential subsequent use of force.

The CPD should re-examine its use of force review protocols, and consider adding the finding at each subsequent level of review and establish a set period for each review to be completed. Additionally, the CPD should consider the utility of having every use of force incident reviewed by the officer’s entire chain of command, including the Chief of Police, although it may be more effective and efficient to prioritize use of force reviews by the seriousness of the force with only the most serious uses of force being reviewed by the Chief of Police, perhaps through a review board process. A common practice within law enforcement is to create use of force review boards, which include select members of the department from varying ranks as well as members of the department’s training staff who are most suited to assess if a use of force is consistent with training and if adjustments to training are necessary. These committees would assemble to review use of force cases where a finding of unjustified is rendered, or for cases involving any serious circumstances.

The CPD should consider implementing this process and include the committee recommendation to the Chief of Police. Finally, the CPD should consider the final review of low-tier uses of force conclude at the deputy chief level.

Community Policing and Engagement

The following is word-for-word of what Jensen-Hughes report said:

As described out in Law Enforcement Best Practices: Lessons Learned in the Field, “Modern policing rests upon the foundational precept that the effective control of crime, disorder and fear requires community participation and assistance.” The President’s Task Force on 21st Century Policing was established to identify best practices in policing and offer recommendations on how policing practices can promote effective crime reduction while building trust. Pillar Four of the task force’s final report “focuses on importance of community policing as a guiding philosophy for all stakeholders.” The U.S. Department of Justice, Office of Community Oriented Policing Services defines community policing as “a philosophy that promotes organizational strategies that support the systematic use of partnerships and problem solving techniques to proactively address the immediate conditions that give rise to public safety issues such as crime, social disorder and fear of crime.”

As described earlier, the Columbus Police Department’s mission and values statements mention the importance of community. For example, the mission statement in the annual budget says they “are committed to communicate with those we serve and to join them in establishing priorities to enhance

the quality of life for the entire community.” Additionally, the department’s vision statement says, “The Columbus Police Department is dedicated to becoming a beacon of professionalism through training and partnership with our citizens, thus establishing safer communities and reducing overall crime.” Both of these are appropriate statements, but the department should consider strengthening the mission and value statements to focus on the use of community partnerships and problem-solving techniques to address crime, social disorder and fear of crime.

CPD General Order 2-9 establishes the purpose of the Crime Prevention/Community Relations Unit to “develop, implement, and maintain education programs and events designed to enhance the Department’s commitment to the proactive approach of policing.” The order further describes the crime prevention unit’s role to serve as a communications link between the citizen and the police department and to establish ongoing programs such as Neighborhood Watch, Crime Stoppers and other crime prevention programs. The order also charges the Community Relations Unit with “the enhancement of the community’s understanding of the role of the police and to assist the police in understanding the role of the community. The role of the Community Relations Unit is to provide outreach through community service, to enhance a positive rapport without losing patrol effectiveness, and enable our department to establish a closer and more effective relationship within all areas of the community.” Appropriately, the order states the ongoing process of community relations is the shared responsibility of every member of the department.

At the time of our assessment, the Crime Prevention Unit was housed in the Bureau of Administrative Services. The unit is supervised by a sergeant and staffed by one corporal. As described in the General Order, the CRU operates or participates in 39 different programs, including Neighborhood Watch, the Citizen’s Law Enforcement Academy, Project Lifesaver, the Drug Abuse Resistance Education (D.A.R.E.) Program and Crime Stoppers. The department should be commended for continuing to be involved in programs with the community. However, because of limited staffing of the Crime Prevention Unit, the department’s community focus is limited to organizing and staffing events, rather than developing true working partnerships with the community. While neighborhood watch groups are active in Columbus, they appear to be more of an information sharing session rather than a session to solve problems collaboratively. In addition, because of heavy workloads, the CRU staff does not have the time to evaluate the effectiveness of its programs towards achieving the department’s goals.

We observed a meeting in the community hosted by a neighborhood group to discuss crime problems in the community.

Nineteen community members and 13 CPD staff members, including most of the command staff, the Crime Prevention Unit and two local officers attended the meeting. The police chief conducted the meeting, introduced CPD staff members, generally discussed the CPD’s approach toward crime in the city and answered questions from the participants. Interestingly, besides the Crime Prevention Unit sergeant, no other CPD staff members spoke at the event. The chief answered all the questions and did not defer to anyone else to respond. If the response required further detail, rather than discuss it in the entire meeting, the chief directed staff members to speak with community members after the meeting. While some staff members did follow up with community members after the meeting, our observations of some participants were that some of these issues which impacted the entire community should have been discussed in front of the entire group, rather than just dealt with on a one-on-one basis with community members.

Recommendation 4.5 of the President’s task force is “Community policing emphasizes working with neighborhood residents to co-produce public safety. Law enforcement agencies should work with community residents to identify problems and collaborate on implementing solutions that produce meaningful results for the community.” The department missed the opportunity for CPD staff members, especially the sector officers, to speak directly with community members and be seen as part of the community. They also missed the opportunity to problem solve jointly with the community members present.

While the two persons assigned to the Crime Prevention Unit are very busy and enthusiastic about their work, the function itself is not supported by a written strategic plan that includes written goals, objectives, and measurable outcomes for all units of the department.

A written strategic plan can provide additional guidance not only to this unit, but also enhance the entire department’s ability to incorporate the concepts of community-oriented policing in all its operations. The current focus of the department’s community relations efforts appears to be in a public relations role, rather than consisting of fostering a work-focused, community-oriented policing/problem-solving approach in which the community is an active participant and collaborator.

Despite General Order 2-9’s guidance that community relations are the shared responsibility of all department members, the order does not provide guidance on how each unit can be involved in community policing efforts. While some CPD officers do participate in some community events, interviews of personnel and ride-alongs revealed many department personnel do not appear to have the time to engage in community policing efforts even if they were provided more guidance on how those efforts could be implemented. Patrol personnel recognize they are often going from call to call with no chance to engage in community policing activities. They also note they are often responding to the same problem multiple times. These types of persistent problems handled by patrol on a case-by-case basis are opportunities for engaging in a community-based problem- solving partnership to reduce their occurrences.

Overall Gang Strategy

The following is word-for-word from the Jensen-Hughes report:

“The U.S. Department of Justice, National Gang Center (NGC) Guide provides a comprehensive gang model that is an evidence-based framework for gang violence reduction strategies. The very first step in development of a gang strategy necessitates acknowledgment of the gang problem.

Thereafter, three core interlinked components are fundamental to a comprehensive strategy – prevention, intervention, and suppression. Police departments play a critical role in addressing gang problems; however, alone they cannot completely solve serious, violent and entrenched gang problems. Gangs are not solely a law enforcement issue but are the responsibility of the entire community. The City of Columbus does not have a written overall gang strategy that encompasses prevention, intervention and suppression.

The City’s Office of Crime Prevention does provide funding for some crime prevention programs related to gang prevention and intervention. The City Office of Crime Prevention has been instrumental in coordinating the support for several important programs. The Office of Crime Prevention funds 35 organizations through grant funding that averages approximately $20,000 to $25,000 per grant. All the programs funded have a conflict resolution component.

Approximately 80% of the funding addresses juveniles in some way and 20% addresses re-entry programs for persons returning to the community from prison or jail. Grant applications are reviewed and approved by a seven-member Office of Crime Prevention board, which includes one CPD member. Upon recommendation by the board, the grants are reviewed and approved by city council.

While a CPD command staff member is on the OCP board, most funded OCP programs do not work hand in hand with the police department. We also learned existing and emerging programs such as Cure Violence in Columbus are already underway and focused on prevention or intervention. Cure Violence programs in other communities, which uniquely employ neighborhood and community influencers to respond to and prevent violent acts of retaliation and revenge, have been shown to effect directly as much as a 28% decrease in shootings. These types of programs operate independently of the city and the department. Yet, their specific missions clearly support an overall gang strategy.

Despite some crime prevention efforts funded by the community, the CPD does not have a coordinated strategy or approach to include the sectors outside law enforcement (community- based organizations, outreach programs, grassroots community groups, education, social services) to assist them in addressing the gang issue. The department can contribute in small but important ways to these autonomous prevention or intervention efforts.

For example, some departments conduct year-round scheduled gang awareness presentations to school and community groups, an activity CPD conducted on a limited basis in the past. Actively collaborating with community groups through a collective overall gang strategy would also align with Pillar Four: Community Policing and Crime Reduction, of 21st Century Policing identified in the CPD Five Year Strategic Plan, 2022 – 2027. Note there are a number of police departments that have developed extremely effective Gang Task Forces over the last few decades that depend upon community collaboration to succeed, with the City of San Jose Mayor’s Gang Prevention Task Force being one, which could serve as a model for future CPD and community efforts to address gang crime.

CPD’s Suppression Approach to Gangs

The CPD does not have a written gang enforcement strategy. The department informed us they have a two-pronged approach to address the increased violence encountered beginning in 2021. This approach was not specific to gangs, but rather violence overall in general.

The chief told us the approach includes community policing and proactive policing.

The proactive policing approach has two parts, according to the chief. One is periodic joint CPD and Georgia State Patrol three-day crime suppression operations in high crime areas to identify and arrest people violating the law, engaging in criminal gang activity, illegally possessing firearms and possessing outstanding warrants. The other is partnering with the Georgia Department of Community Supervision in making arrests on probation violation warrants particularly related to repeat offenders and those involved in violent acts. Our observations found proactive policing by patrol to suppress illegal gang activity was occurring very rarely and was non-existent on most shifts. All the patrol officers and supervisors we interviewed said they primarily conducted reactive policing. Most cited low staff levels and high call volume as reasons they were restricted from being able to engage in proactive policing. For the same reason, some officers reported they do not engage in community policing activities. Additionally, as noted earlier in this report, the department’s current community policing function is not driven by a written strategic plan but is event-driven and not focused primarily on problem-solving.

Most department personnel we interviewed said the department’s current suppression activities were inadequate and far less effective, compared with daily proactive policing activities formerly conducted by fully staffed, specialized and highly trained units, such as the Motor Unit, Special Operations, Narcotics and Tactical Units. For example, police departments have found violence and murder are often tied to narcotics, so a dedicated narcotics unit can serve the dual purpose of developing leads in homicide investigations and removing violent offenders involved in the drug trade from at-risk communities. During interviews, we learned the Narcotics Unit at one time conducted investigations on as many as 180 illicit drug traffickers annually, though currently conduct approximately 20. Most personnel now in Special Operations, some of whom are the most highly trained and experienced in the department, have been detailed to fugitive transport duties involving receiving custody of fugitives across the state and in other states and returning them to Columbus for adjudication. This has left few remaining resources for any type of significant routine proactive policing focused on gangs. The Special Operations Unit within the Bureau of Investigations is charged with illicit drugs, vice and alcohol enforcement and crime suppression duties at the direction of the chief. It contains the Narcotics Unit, TAC Unit and K-9 Unit. Traditionally, the Special Operations Unit has been used by the chief to address crime problems and hotspots.

We identified use of the periodic joint CPD and GSP surges in enforcement activity, consisting of four such operations since they began, as posing unique issues with the Muscogee County Jail operated by the County Sheriff Department. The surges resulted in sudden increases in the number of arrestees being processed and housed at the jail, posing a strain on the jail capacity and resources, and causing some friction between some Sheriff’s Department and Police Department personnel. In comparison to the periodic enforcement surges, routine daily proactive policing by patrol and specialized units results in a steady trickle over time of processing and detaining arrestees at the jail.

Police department gang suppression plans detail in writing the responsibility of patrol, investigations, support services, intelligence, community relations, public information and the entire department to address the most serious gang crime problems, including violence.

Many departments use tools like CompStat routinely to measure gang crime enforcement indicators as a means of evaluating the performance of the districts, bureaus and the department as a whole. Some gang suppression plans encompass sharing gang intelligence with other law enforcement agencies and corrections organizations, targeting and apprehending serious and chronic gang crime offenders, prosecuting gang leadership, utilizing enhanced sentencing provisions and prosecuting under the Racketeer Influence and Corrupt Organizations Act (RICO) and conspiracy statutes.

Gang suppression plans may involve proactively policing the gang factions with the highest propensity for violence. Crimes such as narcotics distribution, firearms possession and trafficking, stolen vehicles and robberies are associated with gangs and used by gangs to fund their illicit activities. Many departments proactively investigate these crimes with illegal gun suppression teams, narcotics investigations units, tactical officers focused on gangs and gang enforcement squads.

CPD does not have a specifically designated functioning gang enforcement unit, nor illegal firearms team within the department. While woefully understaffed, the single, half-time position in the Gang Analysis and Investigation unit has accomplished much and worked hard to make gangs a department priority. We found during our interviews there is not a single person or group within the department where robust knowledge and expertise on all or most of the city’s gang factions, leadership, members, areas of influence and criminal activities exists. We did identify some personnel who had individual expertise on a specific gang, gang faction or gang area of operation due to their work on a specific criminal investigation or assignment.

Participation in a local, regional, state or federal task force is frequently a component of police department gang suppression plans. Beginning in August 1989, CPD participated with the Phenix City, Alabama Police Department; Harris County Sheriff Department and Russell County Sheriff’s Department in the Metro Narcotics Task Force, which was focused on the close relationship between narcotics and shootings by offenders in east Alabama and West Georgia. In January 2020, it became the Metro Narcotics and Gang Task Force, with an added focus on criminal gang activity. The Metro Task Force ended operations in late 2020 after the retirement of CPD Chief Ricky Boren. The CPD currently does not have a formal full-time participation in any local, regional, state or federal task force focused on gangs, drugs, illegal guns or violent offenders.

Task forces are force multipliers for police departments that can result in increased and specially trained personnel from other agencies assisting with the local gang problem. Assigning investigators to task forces also builds interagency cooperation; strengthens trust and relationships between agencies and their personnel; increases gang crime intelligence sharing; provides access to technology and equipment otherwise unavailable to the department; provides highly specialized training and experience for personnel assigned; and combines resources to investigate, prosecute and remove the most violent gang members from the community. They also increase morale in departments by providing additional opportunities for officers to aspire to specialized assignments and receive specialized training.

In 2021 alone, the Georgia Bureau of Investigation’s Gang Task Force investigated 446 gang-related cases across 100 Georgia counties and charged more than 170 gang members. Formally partnering with federal agencies can also benefit departments in bringing federal laws to bear when prosecuting and incarcerating the most violent and prolific gang members and leaders, thereby reducing violence in the community. The Federal Bureau of Investigation welcomes department participation in full-time task force agreements to investigate violent gang members and leaders under the RICO Act that provides for significantly enhanced terms of incarceration for certain gang members. The Bureau of Alcohol Tobacco and Firearms seeks task force partnerships with departments to target illegal firearms and gun-related violence committed by gang members. The Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) has task force partnerships with over 1,700 local and state law enforcement agencies to investigate, arrest and prosecute with federal conspiracy statutes gang members involved in illicit drug distribution to fund their criminal activities.

Gang Data and Analysis

There is a need for analysis of gang activities in Columbus. In addition to department members, community members told us they were concerned about increased gang violence. We examined open-source videos depicting self-proclaimed gang members in Columbus, many possessing firearms and discussing gang activities.

The CPD’s gang analysis function is housed in the department’s Office of Professional Standards and is guided by General Order 7-5.9, the only portion of the General Orders that describes the Gang Analysis and Investigations Unit. General Order 7-5.9 states, “It shall be the responsibility of the Gang Analysis and Investigations Unit to maintain the documentation and to validate gang members.” Note that while the unit is described as “Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit,” it does not engage in any traditional gang investigation activities and is solely focused on identifying and validating gang members. The Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit has no open or active investigations of criminal gang activities. Without the unit’s role in investigations defined in policy, it is not clear whether it has solely an intelligence function or also a criminal investigations and enforcement function.

The Gang Unit is currently staffed by one sergeant – an Office of Professional Standards Investigator, who spends approximately one-half time conducting gang unit work. When fully staffed, the gang unit would consist of four full-time personnel.

Collecting information to validate a person’s membership or association with a criminal gang is an important first step toward effecting prosecution under the Georgia gang statute, which may result in enhanced penalties above those charged for an underlying offence. Using gang statutes is an effective tool in suppressing gang activity. Research in the United States increasingly shows a small number of individuals are responsible for most shooting incidents. We found during our interviews with CPD investigators that suspects are often linked to multiple shootings. Gang statutes are a tool that can remove those responsible for shootings from the community for long periods of time to help reduce firearms violence and protect communities so contributing factors to gang activity can be addressed. To date, the Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit has not presented an investigation under the Georgia Gang Statute to prosecutors for consideration.

CPD General Order 2-10 (A) Gang Validation establishes criteria for validating a gang member or associate, with a requirement for three out of 10 facts being established and documented in writing:

1. An individual admits (self-proclaims) he or she is a gang member or an associate

2. An individual has tattoos that indicate gang member/associateship

3. An individual is continually observed wearing gang clothing, symbols or a specific color bandana to identify with a specific gang

4. An individual is discovered in a photograph with “documented/validated” gang members and using gang related hand signs and/or writings

5. An individual’s name is on a gang roster, gang-related graffiti or other gang documentation

6. An individual is identified as a gang member/associate by another “documented/validated” gang member

7. An individual receives or sends written or digital communication to a “documented/validated” gang member(s) via email, letter, text message or other electronic communication containing gang activity

8. An individual is discovered in possession of a gang’s bylaws, rules or codes

9. An individual is observed flashing gang hand signs or yelling slang before, during and/or after being arrested

10. An individual is observed to associate with other “documented/validated” gang members on a regular basis; to include co-defendant arrests [sic].

The unit validates gang membership by reviewing criminal intelligence reports, case reports, audio/ video recordings, documented self-proclaimed statements and confessions. The Muscogee County Sheriff Office is a primary source of criminal intelligence used by the CPD Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit to validate gang members, followed by the Georgia Department of Corrections and reports from within CPD. Traditionally, jails and prisons are a rich source of gang criminal intelligence for law enforcement agencies. Street gang members routinely self-identify themselves upon admission to correctional and detention facilities for personal safety reasons to avoid placement in cells with rival gang members.

The CPD validation criteria exceed requirements under Georgia policy which require two facts be established, or a conviction for violating state gang law. We observed CPD Gang Analysis and Investigation validation of gang members is occurring appropriately and in adherence to its policy. Documentation supporting each validation is stored for easy retrieval and reviews are routinely conducted to remove dated information. Much of the unit’s time is also focused on updating information on gang members already validated and purging them from the RMS when updated information is not available. The unit is working toward updating each validated gang member profile annually with new information, new criminal charges and new booking photographs when available. The unit purges a validated gang member profile when there has been no available updated information in the past five years, or the person moves out of the jurisdiction of the department.

The CPD Gang Analysis and Investigations Unit uses a grant funded software gang intelligence program and database that is shared with and administered by the Muscogee County Sheriff Office Gang Unit. CPD has been using the program for approximately six months. Joint use of the database contributes to information sharing between the two agencies. However, only the single member of the Gang Analysis and Investigations Unit had access to the program. Providing direct access to CPD homicide detectives, sex crimes detectives, burglary and assault detectives and special operations investigators assigned to narcotics and tactical units would potentially increase the department’s ability to develop enhanced charges under the state gang statutes for consideration by prosecutors.

Outside the gang member validation process, CPD policy does not address specifically any other Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit functions or operations. In practice, the unit’s other function is to send out department-wide notifications of the known addresses of validated gang members recently released from Georgia Department of Correction Custody. This is important for officer safety, situational awareness and can be useful in criminal investigations. The policy should speak to this. During our interviews, it was clear some officers believed, if fully staffed, the Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit would conduct investigations of criminal gang activities. The policy does not address anything the unit was created to do, other than member validation.

The Gang Analysis and Investigations sergeant also provides in-service training department-wide on gang awareness and gang criminal activities. We observed an in-service gang training session and found it was well-presented and provided timely, relevant, detailed information. The sergeant discussed what officers should be looking for in their interactions that may reveal a gang membership or gang activity, including tattoos, markings, insignias, labels, clothing makes and styles, accessories and gang colors, all potential indicators. She further discussed officer safety- related information relevant to contacts with gang members and their associated activities. In the past, the sergeant conducted gang awareness presentations about gangs to school and community groups. This activity ceased due to the current staffing level.

The Gang Analysis and Investigation Unit has occasionally compiled and disseminated gang-related information but rarely produced tactical or strategic intelligence. The lack of analysis of information collected results in little actual gang criminal intelligence being generated. The DOJ’s National Gang Intelligence Center emphasizes analysis as the primary function in gang intelligence. We observed minimal analysis being conducted. In practice in law enforcement, gang intelligence is also commonly viewed more broadly than general criminal intelligence to also include information about gang behavior, signs, indicators, methods of operating and trends derived from raw information learned from investigations.

In the modern era of gang intelligence, using open-source social media to obtain timely and sometimes actionable intelligence is fundamental. Criminal gang members are sophisticated in exploiting all forms of social media to advertise their brand, recruit members, communicate their activities, maintain threatening virtual presences, intimidate and carry out illegal activities., According to the National Gang Investigators Association, the most popular current platforms are Facebook, YouTube, Instagram, Twitter, Snapchat, Google, Flickr, WhatsApp and Kik. Most of the CPD personnel and community members we spoke with told us they had viewed a YouTube video featuring members of a Columbus hybrid gang displaying firearms and discussing their criminal activities.

Departments that do not incorporate social media investigations as a routine step during the investigative process are missing out on a major source of intelligence gathering. The trend for medium and large law enforcement agencies is to designate dedicated personnel or units who specialize in social media analysis to support gang and other criminal investigations. We observed the CPD practice of using open-source media to support criminal investigations in general and those specific to the investigation of crimes with gang links was inconsistent, not standardized and conducted autonomously by individual investigators of varying skill levels. There was no concerted undertaking to daily monitor and analyze social media intelligence for actionable enforcement leads, such as capturing online postings of convicted gang felons posing with firearms or shooting firearms at a firing range. In some jurisdictions, this type of proactive gang intelligence has resulted in significant seizures of illegal weapons, revocation of parole and other tangible gang suppression actions.

During interviews, most Department personnel we spoke with stated the Gang Analysis and investigation Unit provides information of limited value to patrol and investigations. Most cited the Gang Analysis Investigation Unit being in the Office of Professional Standards under the deputy chief as severely restricting information sharing and intelligence support for operations and investigations. It is confusing and illogical to department personnel we spoke with that the unit focused on criminal gangs is under the office that investigates allegations of officer misconduct.

Some officers expressed reluctance to be providing and receiving information with the Gang Analysis Investigation unit sergeant about gangs, as the same sergeant carries a case load of misconduct investigations as an Office of Professional Standards investigator. In our experience, gang units are in the Investigations Bureau where the free flow of information between investigators and analysts augment the investigative processes for all units while contributing to the presence of more robust gang intelligence resources. Our team has not yet encountered a gang unit located within the Office of Professional Standards during our work with agencies over the last ten-plus years.”

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